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NON-AIRBORNE CONFLICTS:
THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF RUNWAY TRANSGRESSIONS
by
Richard J. Tarrel
INTRODUCTION
Ear|y on the morning of December 7, 1983, the pilot of a Boeing 727-200
received his takeoff clearance, applied power, and began rolling down runway
01 at Madrid's Barajas Airport. Visibility was less than 1000 feet. As the
727 approached the intersection of runway 01/19 and taxiways-l through 6, the
pilot saw the hazy form of a DC-9 crossing the runway ahead of him. Before
his evasive maneuver could be completed, the two aircraft collided, killing
82 people. (1)**
The DC-9 had entered the runway at a point where several taxiways meet.
According to some pilots, the taxiway system at Barajas is confusing and not
well marked. In good weather this is not a substantial problem. When visi-
bility is reduced, however, such conditions can lead to pilot disorientation
and inadvertent runway entries.
Low visibility in fog was also significant in Anchorage, Alaska, when,
two weeks after the Madrid accident, a Boeing 747F landed on a pickup truck
seriously injuring the truck's driver. (2) At the same airport several days
later, a DC-IO freighter attemptea takeoff on the wrong runway. It struck a
Piper Navajo waiting to depart at the other end. (3)
Each of these accidents resulted from a runway transgression. In 1977,
it was a runway transgression that claimed the lives of 583 people at Spain's
Tenerife airport. There, a 747 started its takeoff run prematurely and
struck another back-taxiing on the runway in heavy fog. (4)
* _iember of the Aviation Safety Research Staff at Battelle Columbus
Laboratories' ASRS Project Office, Mountain View, CA.
** Numbered references are listed at the end of this repcrt.
Movements on airports with operational control towers are governed by
clearances. Their nature and that of clearance responses is, thus, a primary
factor in causal structures underlying runway transgressions. The research
described herein is motivated by a need for greater understanding of the
interactions among pilots and controllers, and among air traffic controllers
alone, during airport operations.
Scope
The significance of runway transgressions is as much reflected by their
frequency as by their consequences. In this respect, this study attempts to
uncover patterns of behavior that lead to these incidents. How often do
pilots' or controllers' judgements contribute to the chain of events behind a
transgression? What predisposing conditions increase the likelihood of poor
judgements? Which errors, either judgemental or operational, have the pro-
pensity for snowballing into a runway transgression event?
In this study, we define runway transgression as any erroneous occupa-
tion of a runway at a controlled airport by an aircraft or other controlled
vehicle. This omits occurrences at uncontrolled airports or airports where
the tower is closed.
In some respects, the types of behavior and conditions associated with
runway conflicts at uncontrolled fields may be similar to those at controlled
facilities. Pilot behavior, weather conditions, and airport configuration
can be entirely independent of the presence of a tower, thus, certain runway
conflicts are just as likely at either type of airport. However, since
operating practices at the two are innately dissimilar, this investigation is
limited to examining problems in the controlled airport environment.
Background
Clearances are required at controlled airports for all vehicles operat-
ing within the movement areas. The Airman's Informatlon Manual states:
"Approval must be obtained prior to moving an aircraft or vehicle onto the
movement area during the hours an airport traffic control tower is in
operation. ''(5) Movementarea includes runways, taxiways, and other areas
used for takeoff, landing, or taxi. Rampsand parking areas are usually
excluded. Additionally, operations such as inspecting, cleaning, plowing,
and construction also require tower authorization. Errors arise whenany of
these occur in the absence of a required clearance as well as whenclearances
are imprudent, conflicting, or confusing.
Tasks and responsibilities within a control tower are divided among
several persons, the most significant of which are the local and ground con-
trollers. These individuals communicateover two discrete radio frequencies
with pilots and other vehicle operators. The local controller can direct and
separate any aircraft that take off, land, or fly within the airport traffic
area. His authority over aircraft on the airport surface usually begins when
they are ready to depart, and it terminates once a landing aircraft has left
the runway. Tbe ground controller, by current practice, is responsible for
all vehicle movements_prior to takeoff and afte____[rlanding. Thus, the division
of labor between these positions is primarily predicated upon the phase of
operation and not necessarily the physical location of a vehicle: Local con-
trollers handle takeoffs and landings, while ground controllers handle taxi-
ing. Thus, the ground controller is also responsible for clearing taxiing
aircraft and vehicles across runways. These geographically over]apping con-
troller authorities can create the opportunity for errors that lead to runway
conflicts.
In 1978, through the use of ASRSdata C. E. Billings and D. B. O'Hara
authored "HumanFactors Associated with RunwayIncursions". (6) Their report
drew three major conclusions. First, "Incursions by aircraft on the runways
of contro||ed airports represent a significant safety problem." Implied in
this conclusion is the finding that many runway transgressions result in con-
flicts between aircraft or other vehicles. Second, "An important factor in
both pilot-initiated and controller-initiated runway transgressions is the
failure of information transfer among the relevant system participants."
Third, "Taxiing aircraft are a major contributor to these occurrences." The
report also conc]uded that ASRS data indicated the most effective single
point of attack on the problem would focus on aircraft in the taxi phase.
The study reported herein completes a second effort toward using NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)to examine runway transgressions. It
responds to a specific request (7) by the Federal Aviation Administration at a
time when the National Airspace and Air Traffic Control Systemsare undergo-
ing fundamental re-evaluations. Several other factors also motivate this
re-examination: First, recent runway collisions have heightened public
awarenessof a potential problem. Second, the 1981 labor strike and subse-
quent dismissal of most air traffic controllers have led to a gradual
rebuilding of the ATCsystem. By the FAA's own estimate, this process is
still not complete. Entities within and without the government have been
carefully scrutinizing the performance of the newly-staffed system, and, as
traffic volume returns to its pre-strike level, runway transgressions may act
as an indicator of controller effectiveness. Finally, ATCprocedural changes
instituted since ASRS's last look at this topic have now had time to make
their presence felt, ASRShaving received some24,000 reports in the five
years since the first study.
Role of ASRSData
ASRSreports are submitted voluntarily. They describe only occurrences
within the aviation system that reporters believe are important to safety and
that they choose to communicate. Prerequisite to this, reporters must be
able to perceive the safety aspect of the events they report -- a requirement
more relevant than somemay find obvious. Knowledgeof ASRSis by no means
universal, particularly within somefactions of the general aviation commun-
ity. Consequently, ASRSdata probably underrepresent the problems encoun-
tered by those groups.
The greatest strength of ASRSinformation lies in its descriptions of
humanbehavior within the aviation system. Prior to its inception, available
data on patterns of behavior and response were inherently incomplete. Many
aviation accidents result in the deaths of the participants, and no attempt
at accident reconstruction can elicit the entire patterns of thought, percep-
tion, and judgement that precipitate such events. Even in accidents where
the principals survive, it is difficult, in an adversarial environment, to
obtain full information regarding what transpired and why. Through ASRS,
however, reporters may tell as muchor as little as they choose, knowing that
their reports are confidential and anonymous.
APPROACH
In the course of ASRS'sexistence, several terms have been used to label
runway transgression occurrences. Among these are: "runway incursion",
"unauthorized landing", "wrong runway takeoff", "occupied runway takeoff",
"uncoordinated runway crossing", and "uncoordinated landing". A search stra-
tegy using these terms and others yielded 1210 reports of potential runway
transgressions. This was taken to be the population dataset of all such
events reported to ASRSsince May1, 1978. The search wasconducted in Janu-
ary 1984when the database contained 23,291 reports. After detailed analysis
of a random sample of the transgression set, a 4.2 percent false positive
rate was found, meaning that this fraction of the 1210 reports wasestimated
to be irrelevant to this study and discarded.
Methodology
The size of the population dataset precluded an individua| analysis of
every report. To trim _ownthis wealth of data, a one-out-of-three sample
was used. This brought to approximately four hundred the total number of
reports evaluated in detail.
Although most of the coded information in ASRS records is derived
directly from facts provided by the reporters, labelling the causal factors
falls to the judgement of ASRSanalysts. Such labels are applied without the
benefit of knowing to what research a particular report will be applied.
Studying a topic such as runway transgressions thus requires an independent
reassessment of the sample reports. This ensures a consistency of approach
not otherwise available and allows for the assigning of pertinent factors
that maybe applicable only to this particular topic.
The analysis process used herein is diagrammedin Figure 1. For each
type of occurrence a two directional assessment is performed. First, the
event causal structure is described in terms of enabling and associated fac-
tors. Next, the consequencesare judged as well as any recovery actions ini-
tiated. This presumesthat the causes and consequencesof an incident can be
related through the type of occurrence. By the sametoken, the degree of
recovery is assumedto have a logical relationship to the severity of the
consequence.
Associated Enabling Occurrence Consequences Recovery
factors factors module
Iransgressions
Ill,
m
m
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FIGURE I. TOPICAL ANALYSIS PROCESS
Sample Dataset Categorization
The recoding process for the sample dataset sought to describe each
incident through six characteristics elemental to the topical analysis: The
most general is the Type of Occurrence. Enhancing this is the Enabling Actor
which identifies the primary source of fault. Causal structure is then
described by Enabling and Associated Factors. The Consequence
tially describes whether a conflict arose and what its
Finally, Recovery, if it occurred, is described in terms of the
initiated it and the actions they took.
entry essen-
severity was.
players who
Type of occurrence. - This classification is a general description of
the character of an incident. As was evident prior to the topical analysis,
several predictable situations can lead to a runway transgression. Thus,
terms such as "unauthorized runwaycrossing", "wrong runway takeoff", and
"unauthorized landing" all refer to general categories of runway transgres-
sions.
Appendix A shows the authorized entries for Type of Occurrence. After
reviewing a significant portion of the sample reports, it was found that
ground vehicle transgressions usually arose out of behaviors quite similar to
those of aircraft transgressions. Although a numberof reports involving
ground vehicles appeared in the sample set, efforts to code them separately
were abandonedwhen it becameapparent that they did not warrant unique clas-
sification.
Enabling actor. - This is the participant who is adjudged as bearing the
primary responsibility for the transgression. The list of authorized entries
also appears in Appendix A. The Enabling Actor is the individual who had the
last reasonable chance to prevent the occurrence. Often, the first error
precipitating an incident will coincide with the last reasonable chance at
prevention. This usually arises when the chain of events has only one defin-
able link.
During the initial reading of the sample report set it became evident
that apportioning responsibility for an incident was not always straightfor-
ward. There appeared several examples of reports where a participant, seeing
the runway occupied while an aircraft was approaching, took no action to
avert the situation when he or she was perfectly capable, and doing so would
be considered good operating practice. In such cases it may be plausible to
assign some responsibility to that individual. Witness the following
controller-submitted report:
" . Small aircraft A called on frequency and was
cleared to land. Small transport B called ready at 12L
approach end and was told to taxi into position and hold
with an aircraft on landing roll. During this time,
approach called on hot line for voice coordination about
small aircraft C...for landing on runway 12R . As I
returned my attention to approach end of 12L, I observed
small aircraft A landing approximately 1000 feet down
12L, over small transport B . ."
This incident, which occurred during daylight hours in visual meteoro-
logical conditions (VMC), was obviously precipitated by the local
controller's error. His attention was diverted from the runway and he failed
to clear the small transport for takeoff in a timely manner. Aircraft A,
however, was in excellent position to see that the runway was occupied, yet
failed to question the situation or execute a go-around. Instead, the pilot
chose to land over the top of the transport, putting it behind him and blind-
ing himself to its movements. Had the pilot of A gone around, as would be
consistent with good operating practice, this runway conflict would not have
occurred. Barring extenuating circumstances, A's failure to go around is
virtually inexcusable. As such, both the pilot and the controller were coded
as Enabling Actors.
Associated and enabling factors. - These classifications address the
causal structure of a runway transgression. The allowable entries for both
categories appear in Appendix A. Differentiating between a causal factor
that is enabling versus one that is associated is an analytical judgement.
In this study, a factor was considered enabling only if it described a link
in the chain of events culminating in a transgression. When this determina-
tion was not possible, when factors merely added to the probability of an
operational error, or when they contributed only to the severity of an
incident, they were labelled as associated. To be considered enabling, a
particular factor had to evoke a negative response to the question: Had the
factor not been present, would this incident probably still have occurred?
Consequences. - Aircraft conflicts are a consistent motivation for ASRS
reports. Usually, runway transgressions compromise safety only if other air-
craft or vehicles are present. Thus, the Consequence classification denotes
whether a conflict occurred and, if so, its severity.
ASRS codes conflicts in three categories. Those resulting in near col-
lisions are termed "critical". They require that a pilot have taken emer-
gency evasive action or would have had there been time. If a collision
hazard was present but circumstances weren't severe enough to be termed crit-
ical, then the conflict is categorized as "hazardous". Finally, conflicts
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that pose no threat of collision, but are considered to be separation
anomalies, are termed "possible".
Evaluating conflict severity is a subjective process. That which con-
stitutes an imminent collision hazard to one reporter maynot seemas severe
to another and, although objective standards can provide guidance, they do
not directly address the real issue. Rating conflicts by severity is actu-
ally an attempt at comparing the time available for perception and recogni-
tion of a dangerous situation, with the pilot's capability to decide upon and
execute avoidance actions. If a collision is actually imminent, it will
occur unless a pilot's psychological and physiological process time is less
than the closure time determined by the physics of vehicle motion and maneu-
verabil ity.
Recovery actions. - Since it is likely that human error will never
approach insignificance within the air traffic system, participants must be
capable of recognizing and compensating for the mistakes of others. With
automobiles, this is known as defensive driving; evasive action in aviation
usually connotes an extreme form. The Recovery classifications describe this
process when present in runway transgression reports. Two aspects of infor-
mation were recorded: The Recovery Initiator is the person who initially
recognized that a problem existed. This individual need not have taken
action toward recovery: sometimes the person first recognizing the problem is
incapable of acting or lacks the time to act. Actual attempts at recovery
are described under "Recovery Actions". This classifies avoidance maneuvers
into general categories consistent with types most often described by ASRS
reporters. Appendix A lists the various entries.
FINDINGS
Population and Sample Factor Comparisons
The ASRS database yielded incidents spanning a 65-month period, from May
1978 through September 1983. On average, approximately 18 reports per month
alluded to runway transgressions. This takes into account the estimated 4.2
percent rate of false positives observed in the sample set. Although deduct-
ing the false positives reduces the population size from 1210 to 1159, it
must also be noted that somereports allude to more than one incident. In
the one-out-of-three sample, 386 of 403 total reports referenced 396 runway
transgressions. It is likely then, that the population encompassesabout
1189 transgression incidents or 2.6 percent more than the numberof applica-
ble reports. The following analyses assumethe numberof incidents to be
approximately 1.5 to 2.0 percent less than the total numberof reports in the
set.
Descriptive factors. - Table 1 depicts fractional breakdowns of various
descriptive factors coded in ASRS reports. Values are shown for the popula-
tion, sample, and total ASRS database. In all cases, it can be seen that the
sample and population data are well correlated.
The first data group tallies types of air traffic control facilities.
Air traffic control towers appear more frequently in the two groups involving
runway transgressions than in the entire database. This is to be expected as
a result of the geographical restriction inherent in the definition of a run-
way transgression.
ASRS analysts, as part of the routine coding process, identify that ele-
ment of the aviation system which they judge as the primary problem for each
incident. On the presumption that the topical analysis would fall largely in
agreement with this determination, a correlation that did indeed hold, it is
useful to examine the breakdown of primary problem entries. The second data
group in Table 1 shows the primary problem distribution for the three sets of
interest. Again, the population and sample report sets correspond well.
When these are compared with the distribution of problems within the database
as a whole, it is interesting to note that flight crew problems are over-
represented by approximately 12 percent in runway transgression reports while
ATC errors run about 8 percent less than the norm. Airport problems are
cited twice as often in transgression reports while all other problem
categories appear noticeably less frequently than the database average.
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TABLE I. DESCRIPTIVE FACTOR COMPARISONS
Factors
Tower
Tracon
Center
Other
Population
No. of Rpts I Percent
Control 1 i ng
1,068 I 88.3
81 I 6.7
3 I 0.2
58 I 4.8
Sample
No. of Rpts _ Percent
I
Faci Iity
360 I 89.3
26 I 6.5
1 I 0.2
16 I 4.0
Flight Crew Error
ATC Human Error
Arpt Conditlon, Layout, Procedures
Aircraft Equipment
Other (including weather related)
Navigation/Comm Equipment
Publications
Other
2. Primary Problem
766
331
80
13
15
2
3
F 63.3 247
I 27.4 118
! b.b 25
1.1 5
1.2 5
0.2 I
0.2 2
3. Day of Week
61.3
29.3
6.2
1.2
1.2
0.2
0.5
Sunday
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Unknown
159
148
167
191
184
o
190
138
25
! 13.1 49
I 12.2 46
13.8 54
15.8 51
15.2 80
15.7 64
11.4 49
2.1 6
Quarter of Day
12.2
11.4
13.4
12.7
19.9
15.9
12.2
1.5
1 (0000-06OO)
2 (0600-12oo)
3 (1200-1800)
4 (1800-2400)
Unknown
27
374
531
242
28
2.2 7
30.9 I15
43.9 190
20.0 81
2.3 6
1.7
28.5
47.1
20.1
1.5
Day]ight
Night
Dusk
Dawn
Unknown
=
No
Yes
lVfsua! meteorological conditions
Mixed flight conditions
Special VFR conditions ([FR)
Margina] VFR conditions
Unknown
m
Instrument meteorological conditions
5. Lighting Conditions
831
169
47
13
11
68.7 ! 278
14.0 ! 50
3.g ! 22
i.i ; 3
0.9 I 4
Was Wx a Factor?
976 I BO.'_7 327
234 ___ 76
Flight Conditions
120199J42878 72.6 2952O 1.7 51 0.I14 I.I 5
28 2.3 i0
69.0 I
12.4 I
5.5 I
0.7 I
1.0 I
I I
81.1
18.9
73,2
1.2
0.0
1.2
Total Database (5/78-9/83)
No. of Rpts Percent
6,209 26.3
8,225 34.9
1,624 6.9
7,512 31.9
11,789 50.0
8,475 36.0
722 3.1
879 3.7
542 2.3
819 3.5
343 1.5
2,602 11.0
2,975 12.6
3,256 13.8
3,771 16.0
3,539 15.0
3,677 15.8
2,343 9.9
570 2.4
428 1.8
7,200 30.5
10,350 43.9
4,096 17.4
688 2.9
16,465 69.9
2,656 11.3
1,069 4.5
142 0.6
344 1.5
18,046 I 76.65,524 23.4
2,980 12.6
15,010 63.7
1,003 4.3
23 0.1
295 1.3
1,161 4.9
II
The primary problem distribution is fairly consistent with expectations
but does set the stage for more detailed analysis in two areas. The less-
than-normal incidence of ATC problems is not necessarily predictable, and
likewise the higher occurrence of flight crew errors. Determining which
types of transgressions and factors contribute to these inconsistencies is a
goal of the topical analysis.
It is also useful to observe that airport related problems are notice-
ably more prevalent in transgression incidents than in ASRS submissions
overall. It is hardly surprising that confusing airport layouts, signs, and
markings would have a noticeable relationship to runway transgressions. Not
expected however, is the diminished contribution of "other" factors which
include weather considerations.
Datasets 3 and 4 address timing factors. Distribution of transgression
occurrences across the week is entirely consistent with other ASRS data, even
exhibiting the markedly reduced weekend rates found throughout the database.
The time at which an incident occurred is indicated by quarter of the day.
Values for the transgression sets are remarkably consistent with the universe
of incidents contained by the database, although there is a slightly higher
than normal frequency (3 percent) of runway transgressions during the fourth
quarter. This is logical if one assumes that darkness would exacerbate on-
airport navigation problems.
Dataset 5 further illustrates the relationship of time to runway
transgressions. The frequency of daylight occurrences is virtually identical
in all three columns. Although there is a slightly higher propensity for
nighttime occurrences, transgressions occurring during the dawn and dusk
transition periods do not vary significant|y from the norm.
Whereas the most publicized runway transgression accidents seem to
involve poor weather conditions, ASRS data indicate that_only about 19 per-
cent of runway transgression reports tell of weather-related problems. This
rate is actually 4 to 5 percent lower than the database as a whole. The
importance of this observation is obvious. Dataset 7 sheds some additional
light where it indicates that runway transgressions are less likely to occur
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in instrument flight conditions and more likely to occur under visual flight
conditions than other types of incidents. This finding, along with the rela-
tively small increase in the incident rate involving airport problems, indi-
cates that the human error aspect of runway transgressions may be more signi-
ficant when viewed in the absence of expected predisposing conditions.
Operational factors. - Table 2 compares the distributions of several
operating factors among the datasets. It can be seen from the first of these
that pilot or crewmember reporters (including Air Force and Navy) constitute
approximately 60 percent of the runway transgression population and sample
sets, while the remaining portion is derived from controllers. This ratio is
perfectly congruent with that exhibited by all types of ASRS reports. Since
pilots submit the majority of reports, it is interesting to view the break-
down of pilot operational associations. Dataset 2 indicates that air carrier
pilots are overwhelmingly the most frequent reporters. It should be further
observed that air carrier pilot reports citing runway transgressions exceed
the normal rate of air carrier pilot reports present in the total database.
These findings should not be misconstrued to mean that air carrier pilots are
more prone to causing or being involved in runway transgressions. They do
indicate, however, that air carrier crews are more likely to observe
transgression errors. Many factors beside involvement may contribute to
this; one possibility is that air carrier pilots may frequent airports where
local traffic densities and airport configuration might make runway
transgressions more likely.
Datasets 3 and 4 provide a demographic picture of the types of aircraft
and operators appearing in runway transgression reports. Since more than one
aircraft are often present in a single report, the values given are based on
the total number of aircraft in the collection. One cannot, of course,
assume that all aircraft coded within a report are necessarily pertinent to
the transgression incident.
Trend Analysis
Over the past several years, trend analyses of ASRS data have been car-
ried out on an experimental basis. Designing algorithms for trend detection
13
TABLE 2. OPERATIONAL FACTOR COMPARISONS
Factors
Population
No. of Rptsl Percent
I
Sample
No. of Rpts Percent
ASRS Database (5/78-9/83)
No. of Rpts Percent
I. Reporter
Air Force
Crewmember
Controller
Navy
Observer
Passenger
Pilot
Unkno_m
22
59
486
3
4
636
1.8
4.9
40.i
0.2
0.3
52.4
7
19
158
I
218
1.7
4.7
39.2
0.2
54.1
1,463
1,262
9,235
469
173
49
10,892
27
6.2
5.4
39.2
2.0
0.7
0.2
46.2
0.I
2. Reporter's Operation
Air Carrier
Gen. Aviation & Air Taxi
Military
Other
Unknown
529
119
25
4
43
74.0
16.6
3.5
0.6
6.0
190
32
7
1
14
81.2
13.7
3.0
0.4
6.0
8,724
2,229
2,013
138
828
62.6
16.0
14.4
0.9
5.9
3. Aircraft Type
Small aircraft
Small transport
Light transport
Military transport
Medium transport
Medium large transport
Large transport
Heavy transport
Wide-body transport
Military training aircraft
Fighter aircraft
Bomber
Other
Unknown
57O
3OO
68
2O
49
282
338
52
114
10
14
7
8
42
30.4
16.0
3.6
1.1
2.6
15.0
18.0
2.8
6.1
0.5
0.7
0.4
0.4
2.2
187
101
22
4
18
99
110
16
42
3
3
1
9
4. Aircraft Operator
30.4
16.4
3.6
0.7
2.9
16.1
17.9
2.6
6.8
0.5
0.5
0.2
1.5
8,875 23.9
5,416 14.6
1,178 3.1
1,386 3.7
875 2.4
4,972 13.4
6,983 18.8
980 2.6
2,164 5.8
987 2.7
1,272 3.4
670 i.8
348 0.9
958 2.6
Air Carrier
Gen. Aviation & Air Taxi
Military
Other
Unknown
899
421
60
18
475
48.0
22.5
3.2
1.0
25.4
308
136
12
8
151
50. i
22. I
2.0
1.3
24.6
16,674
6,923
4,607
450
8,392
45.0
18.7
12.4
1.2
22.7
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is not difficult and their implementaiton is relatively simple. Problems
arise, however, in identifying report sets that exhibit stable biases over
time.
For a variety of technical and practical reasons, ASRS trend analysis
methods are nonstandard. Historically, ASRS data have exhibited erratic
behavior, non-constant cycles, and sharp discontinuities. Thus, techniques
that rely upon statistically stationary data are not well suited to ASRS
applications. In general, each point in the trend dataset is fitted indivi-
dually. There are no trend equations or related structures underlying the
smoothed trend lines. As each point is fitted, the values of points adjacent
to it are used to generate a set of prior hYpotheses regarding the "true"
value of a given point. The probability that this value is correct is
evaluated by comparing it with the actual observed value. This is accom-
plished by looking at the general scatter in the trend data. The greater the
scatter, the more validity is afforded the hypotheses that vary appreciably
from each observed value. After evaluating 20 to 30 prior hypotheses for
each point, a maximum likelihood estimate of the "true" value is then made.
This estimate is referenced as the "smoothed" value in trend depictions.
Figure 2 is an ASRS trend analysis of the population dataset for runway
transgressions. The columns of values to the left contain the numeric data
for the trend set, the normalizing set, and the relative trend. In this
case, the normalizing set consists of all primary reports received over the
timespan covered by this study. The relative trend is the runway transgres-
sion rate as a percentage of the total primary report rate. The plots to the
right correspond to the numeric data. They are read chronologically from top
to bottom with higher values appearing toward the right. The rightmost plot
depicts the relative trend while the transgression data and normalizing
values are charted to the left.
The relative trend for runway transgressions is typical in that it shows
a cyclic behavior that appears to be seasonal. Transgression incident
reports were at their peak between January 1980 and March 1981. Shortly
thereafter, the air traffic controllers' strike occurred and the level of
reported transgressions dropped. The seasonal variation remains fairly con-
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sistent after the controllers' strike with the exception of the period
between February and July 1982. During this time, the transgression report
rate decreased slightly to its present level. Since the time of the ATC
strike, the overall trend of runway transgression incidents reported to ASRS
shows a very mild abatement.
Topical Analysis of the Sample Set
The sample set was analyzed by thoroughly reading each report. After
initially reviewing every tenth record, lists of authorized entries were com-
piled to serve as a basis for the analytic process. These lists were
appended as was found necessary. The factors utilized in evaluating the sam-
ple reports are shown in Appendix A. The factors assigned each report in the
sample set are tabulated in Appendix B.
Transgression occurrence typology. - Although occurrences were charac-
terized independently by Type of Occurrence and Enabling Actor, detailed
examination of the sample reports showed that the two are logically linked;
this linkage is the basis for an occurrence typology that is used as the
organizing framework for all subsequent analysis.
Figure 3 snows the percentage distribution of the eight most prevalent
incident descriptors (seven categories are included in "all other"). In some
instances, occurrences are described as corresponding to more than one type.
For instance, an "unauthorized landing" might also be labelled a "wrong air-
port landing". The tallies, therefore, will not total 100.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of Enabling Actors. The chart shows
that pilot errors are far more frequent than those of all other enabling
actors combined, totalling approximately 2-1/2 times more than errors by con-
trollers.
Figure 5 snows the six major classifications of runway transgressions
categorized by associating the enabling actor with the operational phase of
the transgressing aircraft. Each bar is sectioned to illustrate the com-
ponent conflict severities for that category. Consistent with Figure 3, this
17
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chart illustrates the preponderance of pilot errors over those of controll-
ers. Within this group, transqressions during arrival and taxi dominate over
those occurring during departure. Reports of controller-enabled incidents
show that errors during taxi are relatively high. However, instead of being
eclipsed by arrival events, as are pilot errors, incidents during the depar-
ture phase are predominant.
Figure 5, in its breakdown by conflict severity, provides the basis for
the consequence analysis of runway transgressions. Each bar depicts descend-
ing severity levels from the bottom to top. It is extremely interesting to
note the manner in which the bar relationships change as one progressively
ignores the conflicts of lesser severity. The top section of each bar
represents the portion of incidents not resulting in a conflict. Looking
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first at the pilot-enabled occurrences and eliminating the no-conflict por-
tions, it is seen that the total number of events is cut in half. More sig-
nificant, however, is that transgressions during taxi now dominate over those
during arrival by a considerable amount. On the controller-enabled side,
this same selective comparison shows the most noticeable decrease in
occurrences during the taxi phase.
The next level in conflict severity involves the "possible" category:
separation anomalies where the risk of an actual collision was insignificant.
By eliminating these from consideration one is left with a depiction of those
runway transgressions where safety was judged to have been compromised. Once
again, the picture changes sharply. With respect to pilot-enabled errors,
the total number of occurrences in the arrival and taxi categories are nearly
equal. Furthermore, the split between those incidents termed "critical" and
those considered "hazardous" is also about even. Pilot errors during the
departure phase number only half those of the other two categories with an
even balance between consequences of a critical or hazardous nature. This
result is still consistent with the overall relationships of pilot transgres-
sions regardless of consequence.
To an even greater degree, controller-enabled transgressions involving a
hazardous or critical conflict can be seen to stand above the rest during the
departure phase. The most remarkable change, however, is the diminishing
presence of occurrences during taxi. Those that significantly encroach upon
safety are consistent with those in the arrival category.
The balance among all categories can be seen to change noticeably when
one considers only hazardous and critical conflicts. Whereas pilot taxi and
arrival transgressions dominate the total occurrence comparisons, the
controller-enabled departure incidents now take the lead. Equally important,
however, is that the predominance of controller departure transgressions con-
sist of critical conflicts which, by themselves, exceed both the hazardous
and critical events in the other two controller-enabled types.
Factor analysis. - The factor analysis of the runway transgression sam-
ple set was conducted as a two-tiered process. Using the groupings shown in
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Figure 5, and within each major enabling factor category, counts of associ-
ated factors were totalled. These were then examined in the relation to
consequence severity. In this manner it was possible to associate different
types of human errors and/or predisposing conditions. Results of the factor
analysis are presented in Tables 3 through 20. The tables show the number of
citations for various factors. Since each report can have multiple enabling
or associated factors, these counts cannot be related uniquely to numbers of
incidents.
Tables 3 through 5 document factors pertinent to pilot-enabled arrival
transgressions. Table 3 tallies these without regard to their enabling or
associated status. They are listed in hierarchical order based upon the
total number of reports in which a given factor is found. This value appears
in the first column. The second and third columns show, respectively, the
number of times a particular factor appears in an incident having a critical
or a hazardous consequence.
In Table 4 factors are differentiated by the enabling and associated
categories. Enabling factors are shown in the left column and for each one,
correlated associated factors are listed in descending order of frequency.
The last two columns delineate the number of times each factor is found in
occurrences having a critical or a hazardous consequence. Values appearing
next to an enabling factor represent only those incidents of a critical or
hazardous nature where that factor was deemed as enabling. Similarly, values
beside associated factors refer only to citations as an associated factor in
critical or hazardous occcurrences.
Table 5 shows the frequency of all factors when aggregated into more
general classifications of interest. The original list of 103 factors was
compressed into approximately 20 categories. Appendix B shows the factor
groupings as a function of each classification. Table 5 is similar to Table
3 in that it does not distinguish between enabling and associated factors,
and only the more preponderant listings are shown.
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TABLE 3. PILOT-ENABLED ARRIVAL TRANSGRESSIONS: ALL FACTORS
Factor
Pilot failure ) contact tower
during approach
)ilot misorientation
_ilot distraction/flying
)ilot workload
estricted visibility
ilot distraction/traffic
)ilot misund tanding of clearance
)ilot unfamil rity with airport
adio communication problem
ilot inexperience
Fraining in progress
Airport config ration
Multiple runway operation/parallel
Pilot distraction/unspecified
)ilot failure ) follow clearance
)ilot misoperation of radio
>ilot failure ) follow standard procedures
>ilot fatigue
(adio equipment problem
>ilot failure ) request clearance
_igh traffic lume
Pilot distraction/equipment failure
>ilot failure ) go around
ontroller failure to issue frequency change
ultiple runway operation/intersecting
Pilot distraction/radio
Readback problem
Use of nonstandard phraseology
_INumber of
Citations
43
29
23
19
14
13
13
12
12
I0
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
Number of
Critical Citations
Number of
Hazardous Citations
I
6
0
0
3
0
0
3
3
2
1
I
2
0
I
0
0
0
0
I
I
0
i
0
0
0
I
0
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TABLE4. PILOT-ENABLEDARRIVALTRANSGRESSIONS:
CAUSALFACTORCORRELATIONS
Enabling
Factors
>ilot failure to contact
;ower on approach
J ,,
>ilot mi sorientation
)ilot distraction/flying
l'ilot misunderstanding
)f clearance
!Pilot failure to follow clearance
Number of
Citations
43
29
14
Associated
Factors
Number of
Citations
12
Pilot workload
Pilot distraction/
flying
Pilot fatigue
Pilot distraction/
radio
Pilot inexperience
Restricted
visibility
Arpt configuration
Pilot inexperience
Multiple runway
operation/
parallel
Pilot workload
High traffic volume
Clearance revised
Pilot fatigue
Readback problem
Radio equipment
problem
Controller failure
to visually locate
traffic position
13
6
4
3
3
Number of
Critical Citations
Number of
Hazardous Citations
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TABLE 5. PILOT-ENABLED ARRIVAL TRANSGRESSIONS:
AGGREGATED FACTORS
Number of Nun_er of Number Of
Factor Citations Critical Citations Hazardous Citations
Pilot oistraction
Pilot failure to contact tower during approach
iommunication problem
Pilot flying tasks
Pilot misorientation
_ilot clearance
Airport geography
_eather
Pilot workload
54
43
4Z
30
29
26
21
20
19
Tables 3 and 4 show that "pilot failure to contact tower during
approach" and "pilot misorientation" are the two most frequently cited fac-
tors. Furthermore, they both appear exclusively as enabling factors. The
phrase "failure to contact tower" refers to what might be simply described as
forgetfulness. This error manifests itself in several ways and is discussed
later. "Pilot misorientation" refers to a pilot's or flight crew's continu-
ous awareness of their geographical position. Most often, problems with
orientation are accompanied by a restricted visibility condition and non-
simple airport configurations. "Pilot inexperience" is also a contributor to
such situations. Arrival transgressions covered under this category include
wrong-runway landings and sometimes wrong-airport landings. Tables 3 and 4
indicate that transgressions due to pilot misorientation result in a critical
or hazardous conflict considerably more often than any other factor. Res-
tricted visibility, primarily an associated factor and predisposing condi-
tion, also appears consistently in critical or hazardous incidents -- though
much less so than pilot misorientation overall.
When factors are lumped together into topical groups, as shown in Table
5, pilot distractions are more frequently cited than failures to contact the
tower. There is probably a fair amount of redundancy of incidents between
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these two groupings. There is some justification for grouping distractions,
workload, and flying tasks together as workload contributors. Each of these
factors is significant in its own right, and if their associated mechanics
and effects are consistent to any degree, the combined group would take on
extraordinary significance. Also high on the list of aggregated factors are
communication and clearance problems. Both are significant contributors to
those incidents with more severe consequences.
Tables 6 through 20 show the results of the factors analysis for the
five remaining occurrence classifications. The tables are similar to those
just discussed.
ASRS reports indicate that taxi transgressions enabled by pilots result
overwhelmingly from problems with clearances. In combination with a propen-
sity for pilot misorientation at confusing airports, this accounts for the
clear majority of these incident types. Most often, there is some aspect of
their clearance that pilots fail to understand. Table 7 indicates that com-
plex airport configurations can exacerbate the effects of this error. How-
ever, multiple active runways, clearance expectations, and a failure to read-
back are significant associated factors. The table also indicates that
pilots will sometimes forget to request a clearance when one is required.
This is sometimes the result of misorientation. A pilot unaware of his pre-
cise position on the airport may inadvertently cross a runway. He knows that
clearance for this is required, but realizes his mistake too late to make the
request. Communication problems, as indicated inTable 8, are also signifi-
cant contributors to these incidents. This is not surprising since such fac-
tors can often be linked to occurrences involving misunderstood clearances.
The final category of pilot-enabled runway transgressions are those
occurring during the departure phase (Tables 9, 10, and 11). As with taxi
transgressions, clearance misunderstandings are the predominant contributor.
In contrast though, airport layout and other geographical factors are not
significantly associated with this. Problems with phraseology, pilot expec-
tations, similar alphanumerics, and intersecting runway operations are most
frequently noted as associated factors (Table 10) with intersecting runways
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TABLE 6. PILOT-ENABLED TAXl TRANSGRESSIONS: ALL FACTORS
Factor
Pilot misunderstanding of clearance
Airport configuration
Pilot misorientation
Pilot distraction/unspecified
Pilot unfamiliarity with airport
Pilot failure to request clearance
Pilot failure to follow clearance
Multiple runway operation/intersecting
Pilot lack of vigilance
Runway/taxiway markings/sign problems
Number of
Citations
Pilot habit
Radio communication problem
Readback problem
Training in progress
Language problem
Pilot inexperience
Pilot workload
Similar alphanumerics
Unique airport procedures
Complex clearance
Expected clearance
Multiple runway operation/parallel
Airport construction
44
40
34
16
15
14
13
11
11
10
Frequency congestion
Pilot failure to follow standard procedures
Pilot misunderstanding of standard procedures
Controller workload
Hearback problem
Night operations
Pilot acting on a clrnc for another acft
Pilot distraction/radio
Pilot nonstandard radio procedures
Restricted visibility
Simultaneous radio transmission
ITraffic volume
Use of nonstandard phraseology
9 0
8 2
8 0
7 0
7 2
6 0
6 i
6 0
6 i
S 0
5 0
5 i
4 0
Number of
Critical Citations
Number of
Hazardous Citations
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TABLE 7. PILOT-ENABLED TAXI TRANSGRESSIONS:
CAUSAL FACTOR CORRELATIONS
Enabling
Factors
_ilot misunderstanding of clearance
Pilot misorientation
Pilot failure to request clearance
Pilot failure to follow clearance
'ilot lack of vigilance
Pilot distraction/unspecified
pilot habit
Number of
Citations
44
2g
14
13
7
6
4
Assoc iated Number of
Factors Citations
Arpt configuration 15
Readback problem 7
Multiple rwy operation/
intersecting - 6
Similar alphanumerics 5
Expected clearance 4
Pilot distraction/
unspecified 4
Pilot habit 4
Pilot inexperience 4
Arpt configuration 13
Pilot distraction/
unspecified 5
Pilot unfami]iarity
with airport 3
Radio communication
problem 3
Training in progress 3
Arpt configuration 4
Rwy/txwy markings
and signs 2
Pilot lack of vigilance 2
Pilot distraction/
unspecified Z
Unique arpt procedures 2
Arpt configuration 8
Pilot unfamiliarity
with airport 3
Rwy/txwy markings
and signs 3
Arpt configuration 3
Pilot workload 2
Arpt configuration 3
Unique airport jprocedures 4
Number of
Critical Citations
4
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 0
1 1
00
Number of
Hazardous Citation!
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TABLE8. PILOT-ENABLEDTAXI TRANSGRESSIONS:AGGREGATEDFACTORS
Number of Number of Number of
Factor Citations Critical Citations Hazardous Citations
pilot clearance problem
Airport geography
Communication problem
pilot distraction
Runway operations
)ilot habits and expectations
Airport surface
pilot vigilance
Control Ier clearance problem
i
81
56
38
21
IB
14
14
13
12
15
g
2
3
5
0
0
2
I
TABLE 9. PILOT-ENABLED DEPARTURE TRANSGRESSIONS: ALL FACTORS
Factor
_ilot misunderstanding of clearance
estricted visibility
ultiple runway operation/intersecting
Number of
Citations
17
7
6
similar alphanumerics
_ilot habit
_ilot mlsorientation
Airport Configuration
Expected clearance
_ilot dlstraction/unspecifled
_ilot failure to follow clearance
_ilot failure to request clearance
_ilot acting on a clearance for
mother aircraft
Pilot fatigue
Schedule pressure
Training in progress
Unique airport procedures
Number of
Critical Citations
2
3
3
2
0
3
4
0
0
2
0
Number of
Hazardous Citation_
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TABLE I0. PILOT-ENABLED DEPARTURE TRANSGRESSIONS:
CAUSAL FACTOR CORRELATIONS
Enabling
Factors
)ilot misunderstanding
of clearance
Pilot Misorientation
Number of
Citations
17
Associated Number of
Factors Citations
Nonstandard
phraseology 4
Expected
clearance 4
Similar
alphanumerics 3
Multiple rwy
operation/
intersecting 3
Pilot
inexperience 2
Restricted
visibility 2
Arpt configuration 2
Training in
progress 2
Pilot distraction/
unspecified 2
Restricted
visibility 3
Intersection
takeoffs 2
Multiple rwy
operation/
intersecting 2
Arpt configuration 2
Number of
Critical Citations
Number of
Hazardous Citations
_ilot failure to request
clearance
>ilot failure to follow
:learance
_ilot acting on clearance
iFor another aircraft
Pilot habit
Similar alphanumerics
o 0
0 0
2 I
I I
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TABLEII. PILOT-ENABLEDDEPARTURETRANSGRESSIONS:AGGREGATEDFACTORS
Factor
Pilot clearance problem
;ommunlcation problem
_irport geography
Pilot habits and expectations
Runway operations
Heather
!Controller clearance problem
Pilot misorientation
)
Airport procedures
L
Number of
Citations
35
20
Ii
Ii
8
8
7
6
3
Number of
Critical Citations
Humber of
Hazardous Citations
TABLE 12. CONTROLLER-ENABLED ARRIVAL TRANSGRESSIONS: ALL FACTORS
Number of
Factor Hazardous Citations
3Controller misjudgment of traffic spacing
Controller failure to visually locate
traffic position
ATCT coordination problem
Airport construction
Number of Number of
Citations Critical Citations
7 I
4 0
2 I
2 0
TABLE 13. CONTROLLER-ENABLED ARRIVAL TRANSGRESSIONS:
CAUSAL FACTOR CORRELATIONS
Enabling
Fac tots
Controller mlsJudgement of
traffic spacing
Controller failure to visually
locate traffic position
Number of
Citations
Number of
Critical Citations
i
Number of
Hazardous Citatlons
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TABLE 14. CONTROLLER-ENABLED ARRIVAL TRANSGRESSIONS: AGGREGATED FACTORS
Number of Number of Number of
Factors Citations Critical Citations Hazardous Citations
Controller misjudgement of
traffic spacing
ATC coordination problem
Airport geography
Communication problem
Controller clearance problem
Runway operations
TABLE 15. CONTROLLER-ENABLED TAXI TRANSGRESSIONS: ALL FACTORS
Factor
Controller failure to visually
locate traffic position
Restricted visibility
Controller misjudgement of traffic spacing
Multiple runway operation/intersectlng
Intratower coordination problem
Controller distraction/unspecified
Intersection takeoffs
Training in progress
Jontroller workload
"Expedite" clearance
Hearback problem
Jse of nonstandard phraseology
_irport configuration
dight Operations
_ilot failure to follow clearance
Number of Number of Number of
Citations Critical Citations Hazardous Citations
26
15
13
11
9
6
6
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
13
I0
7
6
5
3
i
i
3
I
I
0
i
2
I
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TABLE 16. CONTROLLER-ENABLED TAXI TRANSGRESSIONS:
CAUSAL FACTOR CORRELATIONS
Enabling Number of Associated Number of Number of Number of
Factors Citations Factors Citations Critical Citations Hazardous Citation:
Intratower coord problems 15
Controller misjudgement of
traffic spacing
Controller failure to issue
"hold short" restriction
Controller failure to visually
locate traffic position
Training in
progress
Controller
distraction/
unspecified
Restricted visibility
Intratower
coord problems
Arpt configuration
Hearback problem
Arpt configuration
Arpt configuration
Multiple rwy
operation/
parallel
32
TABLE 17. CONTROLLER-ENABLED TAXI TRANSGRESSIONS: AGGREGATED FACTORS
Factor
ATC ccordination problem
Airport geography
Controller traffic sighting
and vigilance
Controller misjudgement
of traffic spacing
Communication problem
Control]er clearance problem
Runway operations
Total
Citations
19
18
I0
8
6
6
6
Number of
Critical Citations
Number of
Hazardous Citations
TABLE 18. CONTROLLER-ENABLED DEPARTURE TRANSGRESSIONS: ALL FACTORS
Number of Number of )lumber of
Factor Citations Critical Citations Hazardous Citations
Controller failure to visually
locate traffic position
Restricted visibility
Controller misjudgement of traffic spacing
Multiple runway operation/intersecting
ntratower coordination problem
ontroller distraction/unspecified
26
15
13
11
9
6
13
i0
7
6
5
3
ntersection takeoffs
raining in progress
iontroller workload
Expedite" clearance
Hearback problem
Use of nonstandard phraseology
Airport configuration
Night Operations
_i]ot failure to follow clearance
6 1
5 i
4 3
4 i
4 I
4 0
3 I
3 2
3 1
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TABLE 19. CONTROLLER-ENABLED DEPARTURE TRANSGRESSIONS:
CAUSAL FACTOR CORRELATION
Enabling
Factors
Controller failure to visually
locate traffic position
Controller misjudgement
of traffic spacing
Intratower coord problems
Use of nonstandard phraseology
All Others
Number of
Citations
25
12
18
Associated
Factors
Restricted
visibility
Multiple rwy
operations/
intersectlng
Intersection takeoffs
Multiple rwy
operations/
intersecting
Restricted visibility
Restricted visibility
Multiple rwy
operations/
intersecting
Hearback problems
Restricted visibility
Multiple rwy
operation/
Intersec ting
Intersection takeoffs
Number of
Citations
Number of
Critical Citations
13
I0
3
0
0
Number of
Hazardous Citations
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TABLE 20. CONTROLLER-ENABLED DEPARTURE TRANSGRESSIONS:
AGGREGATED FACTORS
Factor
Controller traffic sighting
and vigilance
Runway operations
Airport geography
Controller clearance problem
Weather
Controller misjudgement
of traffic spacing
ATC coordination problem
Communication problem
Controller distraction
Training in progress
Number of
Citations
27
19
16
15
15
r
Number of
Critical Citations
13
10
I0
7
5
14
8
8
6
10
Number of
Hazardous Citations
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and similar alphanumerics comprising the largest share in the critical and
hazardous columns.
Table 10 shows restricted visibility cited more often than any other
associated factor, and this is reinforced in Table 9. However, as with run-
way transgressions during taxi, clearance problems, airport layout, and com-
munication problems top the list of aggregated factor categories.
Tables 12 through 20 cover those occurrences deemed the result of con-
troller error. The first of these involves transgressions during the arrival
phase. Although relatively small, this group is dominated by incidents where
controllers misjudged traffic spacing. Better than half of these resulted in
a critical or hazardous conflict. In contrast, Table 13 indicates that the
next three most frequent factors are virtually never found in critical or
hazardous events. Table 13 indicates that no correlations can be made with
any oft-cited associated factors, while Table 14 shows that the generalized
categories also yield no new insights.
The more frequent appearance of controller-enabled departure and taxi
transgressions provides a better opportunity for a comparative factors
evaluation. As with arrival transgressions, Tables 15, 16, and 17 show that
those during taxi often result from traffic spacing misjudgements and con-
troller coordination breakdowns. Intratower coordination problems were some-
times correlated with training, distractions, and restricted visibilities;
however, these associations are weak. On occasion, coordination problems were
associated with occurrences where misjudgement of traffic spacing was cited
as an enabling factor. Table 17 indicates that airport geography is often
listed in taxi transgressions, and this is hardly surprising if one surmises
that more complex airport layouts are more conducive to confusion during
ground traffic control. These situations may also aggravate those occasions
where a controller's ability to see ground traffic is impaired. The aggre-
gated factors list shows airport geography more frequently than traffic spac-
ing errors. All in all, however, the occurrence of critical or hazardous
conflicts during taxi transgressions is well accounted for by intratower
coordination problems alone.
36
Controller-enabled transgressions during departure operations are previ-
ously shown to have a relatively high rate of hazardous and critical con-
flicts. Tables 18 through 20 support this, but more importantly, they show
strong correlations between enabling and associated factors that have not
been seen in the other five occurrence classifications. Table 19 indicates
that a controllers's failure to sight an aircraft is the most frequent ena-
bling factor, followed, quite far behind, by traffic spacing misjudgements.
The most striking revelation from Table 19 is that, regardless of the partic-
ular enabling factor, the associated factors are consistent. Chief among
these is restricted visibility, followed by operations on intersecting run-
ways and intersection takeoffs. The aggregated factors tabulation supports
these observations and further illustrates them by showing the combined
effects of all types of runway operation anomalies. Airport layout is fre-
quently cited in these types as it is in others. However, those citations
are closely followed in numberby controller clearance and weather problems.
The large percentage of each factor that occurs in critical/hazardous con-
flicts is primarily due to the frequency of the more serious consequences
when compared to the total incidents in this category. There are, however,
notable exceptions to this, and these are discussed.
Recovery process. - The last topical evaluation of the sample dataset
involved problem discovery and recovery action. Figure 6 illustrates the
percentage of incidents in the sample where various participants recognized a
potentially dangerous situation. Approximately 47 percent of the incidents
lacked a recovery action. Of those remaining, there is approximately an even
probability that a transgression anomaly would be recognized by a pilot or a
controller. It can also be seen that a significant portion of incidents
involved both pilot and controller recovery initiation.
Specific types of recovery actions are compared in Figure 7. As with
initiation, it is possible for multiple recovery maneuvers to occur during a
single incident. Each involved pilot has the capability to initiate evasive
action and, simultaneously, a controller may also act. Fifty-five percent of
the runway transgressions described did not encompass recovery actions. In
some instances none were reported and in others there was no time available
to act.
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DISCUSSION
It is obvious from the outset that the term "runway transgression" does
not pinpoint or define a particular type of occurrence. It is logical to
separate incidents by their flight phase and enabling actor, and doing so
immediately illustrates the diversity of events that qualify as runway
transgressions. This is further exemplified by the various causal structures
depicted in the preceding factors tables. At the same time, however, there
remain threads of commonality, and these become more apparent in the aggre-
gated factors tables.
Runway transgressions have generated considerable interest in the wake
of catastrophic accidents such as Tenerife, and discussions tend to focus on
causal elements deduced from theory. As a result, there is a tendency to
interpret data with respect to pre-existing theoretical models. Unfor-
tunately, it is easy to look at an incident and attribute its origin to a
stereotypical source. Such an approach may or may not be accurate, but a
truly objective one requires the construction of a model using the data as
foundation.
Pitfalls inherent to this type of research are magnified by the nature
of ASRS reports themselves. The aviation community's perception of a hazar-
dous event is probably affected by publicity of other more infamous
occurrences. Since ASRS reports are usually taken at face value, there
exists some likelihood that a reporter's interpretation of the causal struc-
ture will be erroneously influenced. The factors-analysis process attempts
to circumvent this situation by objectively correlating a set of subjective
I abel s.
An example of this effect is easily seen in the single parameter break-
downs of the population dataset. Most runway transgression accidents have
occurred in poor weather conditions. At first approximation, however, the
population set exhibits a 3 percent lower probability of IFR weather and a 9
percent increase in VFR weather when compared to ASRS incidents as a whole.
Additionally, weather was cited as a significant factor in less than 20 per-
cent of the transgression events and there is no greater likelihood of a
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runway transgression occurring in darkness than that exhibited by other ASRS
reports. Taken at face value, these findings stand in contrast to reasonable
concerns arising from the accident record. However, there is no doubt that
they do represent the characteristics of ASRS reported transgressions. The
question that must then be asked is: What is the relationship between runway
transgressions that result in accidents and those that result only in ASRS
incidents?
Recognition of Inherent Bias
One method of gaining insight into the spectrum of ASRS reported
occurrences is depicted in Figure 5. As one looks at the six occurrence
classifications, their relative contributions change drastically as less
severe incidents are progressively ignored. It is easily seen that pilot-
enabled arrival transgressions take a back seat to those occuring during
departure when only events resulting in conflicts are considered. Taking the
process a step further, these two categories compare equally when only hazar-
dous and critical incidents are viewed. Similar changes in the other clas-
sifications lend support to the conclusion that there are fundamental dis-
tinctions between incidents differing in consequence, but do little to
apprise us of just what these differences are.
In the hope that some deeper understanding of these incident types and
their associated consequences will result, it is useful to evaluate Figure 5
in detail at each level of conflict severity. It should first be observed,
however, that direct comparisons between all classifications are subject to
mi sin terpretati on.
The topical analysis shows that errors committed by controllers are
inherently different than those by pilots. By definition, a controller error
is usually manifested by the issuance of an improper clearance. A clearance
to move on or about an airport creates no problem when only one aircraft is
present. Thus, errors by controllers are not operationally noteworthy unless
a conflict occurs. This is inherently different from pilot-enabled
transgressions wherein error is judged througtl comparisons of actions taken
to actions authorized.
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Figure 5 shows the effects of this dual definition: In the three classes
of controller-enabled transgressions, the contribution of non-conflict events
is quite small. Pilot-enabled transgressions, however, show non-conflict
situations to constitute about half the total. There is a temptation to con-
clude that pilots are more often responsible for runway transgressions, as a
result of our definitions.
A more useful comparison among the six occurrence types is achieved by
considering only those incidents where a conflict is coded. Immediately, it
can be seen that the magnitude of pilot-enabled occurrences is drastically
reduced. It is now clear that pilot-enabled taxi transgressions dominate the
picture with pilot-enabled arrival and controller-enabled departure incidents
a close second. If we eliminate the "possible conflict" incidents, the rela-
tionships once again change substantially. Pilot-enabled taxi transgressions
take on less significance, and, as mentioned before, appear about equal with
pilot arrival transgressions. Both of these follow controller-enabled depar-
ture incidents which now has the largest share of the total.
Elimination of occurrences coded as possible conflicts and the signifi-
cant change this creates must again alert us to the possibility of misin-
terpretation. There is reasonable justification for believing that, as with
the non-conflict incidents, possible conflicts do not exist with equal oppor-
tunity in all classifications. One explanation for this lies within its
definition and the reporting bias it engenders. As stated previously, possi-
ble conflicts are coded when a less-than-standard-separation event occurs.
This is usually defined by ATC standards and does not imply that an imminent
safety hazard exists. Because of this, pilots are unlikely to know when
these separation losses occur. They are neither aware of the standard nor
cognizant of a conflict situation. Thus, it is rare that pilots will report
such an incident to ASRS.
The final comparison to be made is between those transgressions that
resulted only in a critical conflict. Noticeable changes do occur in the
controller-enabled categories but none significant enough to alter their
relative order. Changes among pilot-enabled categories are even less notice-
able.
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Since runway transgression classifications exhibit such anomalous
behavior when no-conflict and possible conflict occurrences are considered,
and since they are not associated with any definitive safety hazards, it
seems reasonable to omit them when attempting to quantify the significance of
transgression problems. Figure 5 indicates that the greatest influence on
the population of critical and hazardous events is exerted by the
controller-enabled departure category. It towers over the other classes of
controller-enabled incidents and leads pilot-enabled occurrences also. Most
important, however, is that incidents of a critical nature account for a
clear majority in this category whereas that is clearly not the case in the
others. If ASRS data are at all representative of true safety threats then
controller-enabled departure transgressions hold the highest potential for
danger.
Risk Assessment Based Upon Consequence
Figure 5 may be viewed as a qualitative depiction of risk. According to
accepted methods, risk associated with a particular type of event can be
quantified by summing the product of frequency and severity:
RISK =_[ (frequency)_(severity)_]
Although no attempt has been made to assign numerical values to the conflict
severity levels, it can be seen that, on a relative scale, risk associated
with controller-enabled departure transgressions will be relatively high
since that category has the highest frequency of critical conflicts and the
highest overall number of critical and hazardous incidents. The listings
below show the relative rankings of each occurrence classification for each
level of consequence severity based upon evaluation of the sample set:
Critical Conflicts
1. Controller-enabled departure
2. Pilot-enabled taxiing
3. Pilot-enabled arrival
4. Pilot-enabled departure
5. Controller-enabled taxiing
6. Controller-enabled arrival
Hazardous Conflicts
1. Pilot-enabled taxiing
i. Pilot-enabled arrival
3. Controller-enabled departure
4. Pilot-enabled departure
4. Controller-enabled taxiing
6. Controller-enabled arrival
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Possible Conflicts No Conflict
1. Pilot-enabled taxiing
2. Pilot-enabled arrival
3. Controller-enabled departure
4. Controller-enabled taxiing
5. Controller-enabled arrival
6. Pilot-enabled departure
1. Pilot-enabled arrival
2. Pilot-enabled taxiing
3. Pilot-enabled departure
4. Controller-enabled taxiing
5. Controller-enabled departure
6. Controller-enabled arrival
As seen under the "No Conflict" heading, controller-enabled transgres-
sions all fall at the bottom lending credence to the earlier contention that,
by definition, they are only reported when a conflict exists. Outside of
this category, the remaining three lists all indicate that controller-enabled
departure, pilot-enabled taxi, and pilot-enabled arrival consistently occupy
the top three slots.
Effects of the PATCO Strike
In early August 1981, a labor strike by most of the nation's air traffic
controllers left the ATC system in limbo. Most of the striking controllers
were terminated and rebuilding of the air traffic control system commenced.
The hiring and training of new ATC personnel put the Federal Aviation
Administration in the challenging position of maintaining air traffic ser-
vices at a safe (albeit limited) level until the controller workforce could
be expanded. As a result, the public has demanded a more frequent accounting
of ATC system performance since the strike.
Figure 8 is identical in format to Figure 5, however, it includes only
incidents within the sample set occurring after the controllers' strike. The
notable aspect of these results is that they show a substantial change in the
relationships among transgression categories. The relative magnitude of
pilot-enabled arrival transgressions involving critical or hazardous con-
flicts has risen remarkably with respect to pilot-enabled taxi transgres-
sions. The most striking factor, however, is the overwhelming domination of
controller-enabled departure errors -- especially those of a critical nature.
It was apparent from the previous analysis that this type of runway
transgression held the greatest risk. Now it appears likely that the overall
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situation is being driven by events during the post-strike period. The rela-
tive contribution of each type of controller-enabled occurrence remains
essentially unchanged. Pilot-enabled arrival transgressions, however, rise
significantly above other pilot-enabled incidents in the frequency of
safety-threatening events. When compared together, controller-enabled and
pilot-enabled transgressions indicate another significant change:
Controller-enabled taxi incidents, which represent a considerably smaller
portion of the total than pilot-enabled departure and taxi occurrences, now
substantially exceed them in the post-strike era.
To summarize these findings, it appears that the record of ASRS reported
runway transgressions, during the period following the ATC labor action,
shows a significant risk associated with controller-enabled departure and
taxi transgressions as well as pilot-enabled arrival transgressions. Other
classifications of incidents depict diminishing contributions to the whole.
The lists below rank the frequencies of each category of occurrence by level
of conflict severity:
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Critical Conflicts Hazardous Conflicts
1. Controller-enabled departure
2. Pilot-enabled arrival
3. Pilot-enabled taxiing
3. Controller-enabled taxiing
3. Controller-enabled arrival
6. Pilot-enabled departure
1. Pilot-enabled arrival
2. Controller-enabled departure
3. Controller-enabled taxiing
4. Pilot-enabled taxiing
4. Pilot-enabled departure
6. Controller-enabled arrival
Possible Confl icts
1. Controller-enabled departure
2. Controller-enabled arrival
3. Controller-enabled taxiing
3. Pilot-enabled arrival
5. Pilot-enabled departure
5. Pilot-enabled taxiing
No Conflict
1. Controller-enabled departure
1. Controller-enabled taxiing
1. Controller-enabled arrival
1. Pilot-enabled departure
5. Pilot-enabled arrival
5. Pilot-enabled taxiing
Without an empirical quantification of the conflict severity levels it is not
possible to perform a detailed risk comparison. It is clear, however, that
the overall frequency of reported controller-enabled transgressions has
increased during the post-strike period when compared to the whole sample.
Since post-strike runway transgressions exhibit notable differences from
those of the entire sample set, and without minimizing the implications of
these, a caveat is in order: The breakdowns of the various post-strike
occurrence classifications by severity level are derived from a set of
incidents approximately one-quarter the size of the sample dataset. Thus,
relative comparisons amongst these records will be less accurate than those
between incident groups from the entire sample. This is purely a function of
the size of the sets. Statistically speaking, the confidence levels attri-
butable to the post-strike comparisons will be less.
Causal Structure of Runway Transgressions
The factor analysis, to a first order, pinpoints those errors and
predisposing conditions most often associated with a given classification of
occurrence. At a deeper level, however, it may be possible to observe con-
sistent relationships among various factors. The following discussions focus
on these relationships and the behavior and circumstances most often associ-
ated with each occurrence classification.
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Pilot-enabled arrival transqressions. - It was noted earlier that
pilot-enabled arrival transgressions were most often coded with enabling fac-
tors that referenced forgetfulness or a loss of position awareness. Analysis
of reports from the sample indicated that a pilot's forgetting to contact the
tower on approach was most often accompanied by some form of distraction,
including abnormally high cockpit workloads. Often, pilots had no explana-
tion for their oversight and some could not specifically recall whether or
not they had talked to the tower. It is clear that, in this type of situa-
tion, the crew concept does not always provide the intended redundancy. Fre-
quently, this is due to the distribution of duties assumed by the pilot fly-
ing versus those by the pilot not flying. ASRS data have previously engen-
dered research on the distribution of cockpit duties. (9} The sample dataset
of runway transgressions indicates that pilots not flying were usually
expected to handle communication so that the flying pilot's attention could
be totally devoted to aircraft control and guidance. It is clear that this
apportionment of responsibility, coupled with the increased workloads
inherent during approach, require crewmembers to sacrifice some ability to
monitor their partners.
Figures 5 and 8 indicate that, overall, the large number of pilot-
enabled arrival transgressions do not result in safety-threatening situa-
tions. Interestingly, however, all of the non-conflict incidents were
reported prior to the controllers' strike. When added to the relatively
large number of hazardous conflicts also occurring post-strike, it could
indicate that a change in ASRS reporting biases resulted from the ATC labor
action. This notwithstanding, the following reports illustrate that, in IFR
conditions, the consequence of this type of error can be very severe:
"We (medium-large air carrier, A) were waiting for depar-
ture from runway 8 at Atlanta. The weather at the time
was indefinite zero, sky obscured, visibility i/4-mile
with an RVR on runway 8 of 6100 ft. at approach end, with
1200 ft. midfield, and 800 ft. on rollout. We were
number one for departure waiting on arrival of a large
transport air carrier, B. Tower asked us to advise them
when B went by the approach end of the runway so we could
take position. So B landed and we were cleared into
position and hold. Also at this time there was a large
transport air carrier, C, on the approach to runway 8.
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After approximately 2 minutes waiting for B to clear the
runway, we were cleared for takeoff. After rolling
approximately 200 ft. we were told to hold our position
and cancel takeoff clearance due to C still on the
approach. At this time tower advised C to go around
because we were still sitting on the runway...but we
never heard an acknowledgement from C. Still in posi-
tion, the next thing we knew, C came right over the top
of us, missing us by --it seemed like-- inches. His
thrust rocked our aircraft as he initiated a go-around.
His aircraft came within 5 feet of touching down in the
go-around ....We later learned that C was never on tower
frequency, but still on approach control throughout the
entire approach and go-around, and C never heard the go-
around call from tower. Obviously C made a normal
approach down to minimums, saw us sitting on the runway,
and initiated a go-around, missing us by inches."
"While making an approach to runway 8 in Atlanta,
approach control failed to hand us off to Atlanta tower
for landing clearance. I did not find this particularly
unusual, for we are often cleared to land on approach
frequency at certain facilities ....Upon completing our
final landing checklist, I realized we had not yet
received landing clearance, so I called approacn con-
trol .... No response was received and at this time we
were in the final and critical phases of the
approach...as decision height, approach light sighting,
and runway threshold sighting occurred, a medium large
air carrier was also sighted (fortunately) in takeoff
position on the runway. Immediate go-around was ini-
tiated .... Later,...I discovered that tower had been
attempting to have us go around on their frequency, and
couldn't understand why I didn't comply. It never
occurred to them that perhaps I wasn't receiving their
transmissions."
These narratives give us the benefit of viewing the situation from both
aircraft. Although pilot-enabled landing transgressions may rarely cause a
safety-threatening problem, the inherent danger illustrated above is that of
being completely without con_nunication during final approach. Approach con-
trol is likely to think that a pilot inside the final approach fix is out of
his jurisdiction. If the pilot fails to change to tower frequency, there now
exists no path for verbal information transfer, and until the aircraft des-
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cends below the clouds, pilots cannot receive any information, aural or
visual. The foregoing example illustrates that a threat perceived at the
decision height limits the ability of a large aircraft to initiate a safe
go-around.
Pilot misorientation during arrival is another significant contributor
to these transgressions, and the types of associated factors pertinent to
this error are quite different from those leading to forgetfulness. Often,
errors of this sort result in landings on the wrong runway or even at the
wrong airport. The following excerpt shows that a pilot's inexperience can
sometimes lead to problems:
"I sent my student on a solo cross-country flight to BDL
airport. Enroute, student believed he was on course but,
in fact, was drifting well south of intended course.
He then spotted PVD airport which he thought was BDL.
Since he could not communicate, he elected to land. He
followed traffic to runway and landed without further
problems. He was met by airport personnel...and was
informed he was at Providence. "
Experience, however, is not always a saving grace:
"...I was instructed to land on runway 4L at Honolulu
airport. I landed and, on rollout, the tower told me
that I had landed on the wrong runway, and said 'no prob-
lem'. But sure enough, I had landed on runway 4R. I
have probably made in the neighborhood of 5000-6000 land-
ings at Honolulu and have no explanation of how I managed
to do that."
The data strongly suggest that there is no one fix for eliminating
pilot-enabled arrival transgressions. The most effective attack should prob-
ably aim at reducing or mitigating occasions where pilot workload and dis-
tractions become exorbitantly high. These conditions can sometimes be exa-
cerbated by certain environmental and operational restrictions including
visibility problems, airport layouts, and parallel runway operation. When
weather conditions are good, the inherent risks are apparently small, even in
the presence of other aircraft. When ceilings and visibilities drop, the
data still imply that changes of accidents or critical conflicts remain
moderate.
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Pilot-enabled taxi transqressions. - Taxi transgressions arising out of
pilot error are primarily the consequence of information transfer breakdowns.
Clearance misunderstandings, the enabling factor most predominant in the sam-
ple, seemed to result from three well-known problems: First is the diffi-
culty in interpreting clearances at airports with complex
Second, are problems related to hearing messages via radio.
occurrence for one pilot to accept a clearance intended for
cially when there is similarity between call signs. (8)
configurations.
It is a common
another espe-
"I was the captain of air carrier flight A that inadver-
tently crossed runway 26. We taxied on Charlie taxi-
way to hold short of runway 26 at a fair distance (300-
500 ft.). I heard ATC ground control clear us to close
up behind a company air carrier and cross 26. After
that...[the first officer] and I heard the final clear-
ance to cross runway 26. The first clearance in my mind
was to close up the distance and cross but it is predi-
cated on closing the distance and for me it requires a
final clearance before I would cross.. Shortly after
crossing [the ground controller] informed us that we had
crossed without a clearance. It was a very busy
time...and many radio transmissions were being blocked
at the time, which is not uncommon. What is heard at one
end of the airport may not be heard at the other due to
distance and power of the blocking radio. We must have
heard fragments of other call signs that sounded like
ours and the fragments repeated themselves to fit the
situation from our viewpoint."
"An aircraft was cleared for takeoff (VFR) from runway
3OR. Two airport vehicles (red pickup, black pickup)
were holding short of 30R as instructed. The red pickup
was at the approach end of 30R and the black pickup was
at the departure end of 3OR. When the aircraft was
cleared for takeoff runway 30R and passed the approach
end, I cleared the red pickup to cross 3OR. Both vehi-
cles acknowledged and crossed 3OR. The black pickup
crossed in front of the departing aircraft."
Pilots have also confused their instructions by mishearing taxiway
designations and runway numbers. Compensation for such events can often be
made by regularizing the use of clearance readbacks. The lack of such read-
backs is a significant associated factor in clearance misunderstandinqs.
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The third problem is often a manifestation of pilot complacency. Dis-
tractions or preoccupations can lead to pilots responding to clearances they
expect rather than those actually received, and this may also result from
well-established habit patterns at given locations.
Misunderstanding is not the only clearance-related problem promoting
taxi errors. Pilots regularly forget to request clearances and just as often
fail to adhere to clearances received. Often these are related. A pilot
preoccupied by checklist procedures may taxi across a runway when he was
cleared to hold short. Again, it is likely that he was acting out of habit
and never really heard the "hold short" instruction.
"I was captain of commuter aircraft A.... I received my
clearance and taxi instructions for runway 36. I pro-
ceeded to taxi from gate 5 to runway 36 by taxiway B.
After I crossed runway 27R using taxiway B, the ground
controller proceeded to chew me out for not holding short
of an active runway. At that time, I saw what appeared
to be aircraft B fly over my left wing in a go-around.
The controller claimed I acknowledged the hold short
order, but I told him that I did not remember one and I
taxied across the runway not seeing the other aircraft."
As with landing transgressions, position awareness plays a noticeable
role in taxi errors. A common contributor to this is, once again, distrac-
tion or preoccupation. A pilot's unfamiliarity with an airport can be ele-
mental to misorientation, but cockpit preoccupations at fields where a pilot
is experienced can lead to similar problems w_en the airport layout is com-
plex :
"I taxied out of our gate area and made a left turn onto
taxiway H from taxiway C. I continued to taxi east on H
which I thought was taxiway 4 going to runway 21C, the
runway we had been cleared to. Someway I had in my mind
that we had departed the ramp at B instead of C and the
left turn had put me on taxiway J. I crossed an active
runway (21C) which I thought was old runway 33 which is
now taxiway A. We were running our before-takeoff check-
list and while making the instrument check I realized we
were going the wrong direction. At about the same time
ground control called us and said we had crossed an
active runway without clearance. We realized this to be
true. However out of habit I always make a visual check
for traffic when crossing any runway or taxiway. I
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checked this time and there were no traffic either T.O.
or |anding, or taxiing. We changed to the tower and took
off on 21C. I believe the incident occurred because I
did not take enough time studying the airport page before
starting to taxi. I should have had it firmly in my mind
just how I was going to get where I was going.. Wait-
ing to use the takeoff check until I was nearer the take-
off point would be a better procedure. I will do this at
all times in the future. I have been flying in and out
of this airport for at least 20 years, but many changes
have been made and runway 21C used to be 21L... I will
slow down and take the above steps even if I have
departed the gate late."
A comparison of Tables 7 and 10 show that the most common enabling fac-
tors in pilot-enabled taxi transgressions are also present in departure
transgressions. Again, misunderstanding of a clearance is found most often,
with pilot misorientation next. These are followed by failures to request or
to follow clearances. There is also some similarity in the associated fac-
tors coupled with these, but there are some differences too. Beside those
linked with taxi clearance misinterpretations, factors such as use of non-
standard phraseology and restricted visibility also appear related. The fol-
lowing reports illustrate that restricted visibilities can present problems
for pilots and controllers alike:
"...I was the captain of a medium-large air carrier ....
I departed from the terminal...with directions for take-
off from runway 28R. While enroute, the controller
changed the takeoff runway to 28L and directed the flight
to use taxiway P and runway 14. I proceeded as directed,
received clearance, and took off .... It now appears that
the flight departed from 28C, not 28L. The weather...was
very poor due to low ceilings, rain, and fog. The run-
ways 28L and 28C have no signs to identify which is
which. The lights for 28C were on while it was not
intended for use."
"Aircraft was not visible from tower due to restricted
visibility. Aircraft had been issued instructions to
taxi to runway 28. Aircraft was given takeoff clearance
on runway 28. Aircraft departed runway 32 nearly hitting
a maintenance vehicle on runway 32. Vehicle was observed
to take evasive action to avoid collision."
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Pilot-enabled departure transqressions. - As in other transgression
types, the partyline nature of radio communication can contribute to pilot-
enabled departure errors too. We have already seen how similar call signs
can lead to clearance misunderstandings. In addition, problems with
phraseology consistently appear as seeds for transgression events. The next
_xamples depict this and the potential problem caused by multiple runway
takeoff operations.
"...controller clearing flights for takeoff on (inter-
secting) runways 4L and 32R. Air-carrier flight XXX was
cleared into position on runway 32R. Tower had just
given [departure] ahead of flight XXX a heading and hand-
off to departure control. Tower then instructed:
'[Flight XXX], heading 080, departure 125.0'. I
responded 'Roger, XXX cleared to go, heading 080.' Tower
responded 'Roger XXX'. I then commented to captain that
it was, indeed, a strange way to issue a takeoff clear-
ance. Captain started takeoff roll and .... At approxi-
mately 60-70 knots, second officer remarked that he
thought tower wanted to talk to us - i.e. evidently was
unaware we were commencing takeoff roll. I started to
respond immediately that flight XXX was taking off, but
tower interrupted with 'continue takeoff'. A following
transmission by the tower was blocked. (Sounded like a
heading instruction). At rotation I notified the tower
that XXX was airborne off 32R and asked for confirmation
of heading. Tower instructed a turn to a 040 heading and
to call departure 125.0. . In sequenced takeoff
traffic it is my opinion that the cockpit crew is very
prone to interpret an ambiguous instruction or advisory
as a takeoff clearance. The tower controller never said
to 'hold' or that flight XXX would be delayed - but gave
heading instruction - a very frequent or 'automatic'
instruction usually incorporated within a takeoff clear-
ance. My response 'cleared to go' was incorrect. I
should have responded 'cleared for takeoff' "
"Two aircraft in position on crossing runways. Air car-
rier A was cleared for takeoff. Both air carrier A and
small transport B began takeoff roll. I believe this was
due to frequency interference and congestion. I aborted
air carrier A immediately thereby avoiding a possible
disaster."
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Taxi transgressions resulting from misorientation were sometimes seen
accompanied by cockpit preoccupations and exacerbated by a pilot's lack of
familiarity with an airport. Neither of these, however, appear prevalent dur-
ing departure transgressions. Instead, restricted visibility and multiple
takeoff origins replace them. At airports with long runways, it is common to
find takeoffs being authorized from intersections as well as runway end. The
following controller-submitted report demonstrates how these factors can all
combine into a problem:
". • • small aircraft A was cleared for takeoff on runway
3 from the intersection of runways 9 and 32. The
aircraft's initial takeoff roll could not be observed
because most of the intersection where the 3 runways
cross is obscured by the cab of the old control tower,
which supposedly was to have been removed when the new
tower was built. It soon became apparent, however, that
the pilot had turned onto runway 9 for his takeoff when
he was seen rolling down the wrong runway and lifting off
over the nose of a light transport B, which had been
cleared 'into position and hold' on runway 9 from an
intersection downfield, prior to the time small aircraft
A was cleared for takeoff on runway 3.. I believe the
greatest contributing factor to the problem is the confu-
sion generated among both pilots and controllers by the
complexity of the airport operation and the standard
practice of simultaneously utilizing five different
runways...for landing and takeoffs. The traffic patterns
and departure paths criss-cross in a very complex manner
and provide built-in conflicts for the tower controllers
who have to struggle just to keep track of all the
diverse operations, let alone control them. There are
busier airports in the U.S. operating on only 2 or 3 run-
ways and handling more traffic in a safer fashion because
traffic flows smoothly in the same direction and resem-
bles some organization."
Pilots sometimes takeoff thinking they are cleared when, in fact, they
are not. This is often the result of developed habit patterns that manifest
themselves during periods of complacency or high workload. The following
report, concerning operations at Kodiak, Alaska, portrays a nonstandard
situation but still exhibits this point quite well:
"The medium-large air carrier flight was cleared into
position and hold. Distance from parking to takeoff
position is approximately 1500 feet. In that time frame
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the crew must perform...in as fast and safe a rate as
possible to be completed and ready for takeoff when in
position so as not to waste fuel. Kodiak is a one-way
land and takeoff field. At least 90 percent of all take-
offs are runway 7. ATC clearance will not be issued
prior to taxi and adds work in an already short time
span. The only clearance you ever seem to get is taxi
into position and hold regardless of traffic, IFR or VFR.
When you ask why we have to hold it is because the tower
cannot see the aircraft. This is an unusual procedure,
legal, but not normal or safe. Flight [in june] departed
without takeoff clearance as another flight did less than
two weeks ago. I have talked to five different people
that have done the same thing. There is something very
wrong, that departures without takeoff clearance are hap-
pening."
Controller-enabled arrival transqressions. - Transgressions enabled by
controller error are characterized by enabling factors quite different from
those where the transgressions are enabled by pilots. The associated factor
listings, however, indicate that substantial similarity exists among condi-
tions that predispose both pilots and controllers to error. As mentioned
before, arrival transgressions arising from controller error are dominated by
mistakes in traffic spacing judgement. The total number of these transgres-
sions is small but, since they appear frequently in conjunction with other
types of controller-enabled incidents, it is useful to illustrate them in
this context also:
"Aircraft A was on approach to land, inside the marker.
Aircraft B was cleared into position, and was told to
expect immediate takeoff. Aircraft A was told to stand
by for possible go-around. When aircraft A was less than
75 feet from touchdown, aircraft B rotated, and aircraft
A was told to go around. Aircraft B and aircraft A were
both climbing but aircraft A was overtaking aircraft B.
Aircraft A made a right turn with less than 200 feet
lateral, 100 to 150 feet vertical separation ...."
"Landing heavy transport A runway 22L crossed runway 27
with large transport B at touchdown and landing roll. I
applied anticipated separation which did not occur and
had 4000 feet of spacing from B which landed runway 27 as
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A crossed that runway. I advised A keep forward speed
up, traffic landing on 27 crossing runway. Other
factors:...poor arrival spacing by approach control. "
"The local controller approved the ground controller to
allow a car on the active runway. Local control did not
see the car nor question the ground controller as to the
position of the car and cleared an aircraft to land on
the runway that the car was travelling on. The car
driver observed the aircraft and moved to the side of the
runway ....Local controller forgot about the car and
therefore failed to coordinate with the ground controller
to remove the car from the runway."
Controller-enabled taxi transqressions. - In the past, concern regarding
runway transgressions has focused on those involving taxiing aircraft and
specifically upon occurrences arising from a coordination problem within the
tower. In 1978, the first ASRS study of transgressions responded to this
focus when it found that information transfer among all participants was a
primary causal factor. Tables 15-17 indicate that coordination between the
ground and local controller is, indeed, most often cited in taxiing
transgressions. However, coordination problems do not appear nearly as sig-
nificant in the other classes of controller-enabled occurrences. In the wake
of the controllers' strike, training became a much more common activity in
the ATC environment. Though training in progress is often cited as an asso-
ciated factor, at times it is not clear whether it contributed to a given
incident:
"I was watching a trainee on local at the time of the
incident. We were departing runway 13 and landing runway
22. Medium-large aircraft A requested a departure from
runway 22 because of his weight and the wind. Ground
taxied him to runway 22 and put him on my frequency.
After an arrival, A was told to taxi into position and
hold runway 22. Ground asked for a crossing clearance at
taxiway E and was denied. Once the arrival had cleared
the runway, my trainee cleared A for takeoff runway 22,
then turned around and made a blanket statement, 'rolling
22'. Ground control thought my trainee had nodded his
head in approval for crossing runway, so as soon as the
arrival had passed taxiway E, ground crossed medium-large
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aircraft B while A was rolling down the runway. My
trainee saw B going onto the runway and, in hopes that he
had already switched to tower frequency, started yelling
at him to hold his position. By this time A had already
seen B going onto the runway and started stopping. No
evasive action was necessary since A stopped in time."
Some reports allude to tower coordination errors by implication only.
The following submittal by an air-carrier first officer describes the poten-
tial danger inherent in an uncoordinated runway crossing which, in this case
is exacerbated by some non-common phraseology:
"Captain made normal approach and landing of air-carrier
aircraft A on runway 25L at LAX, Conditions: VMC;
weather no factor. As we approached high speed taxiway
42H, I called the tower and asked, "Stop or go?" As we
entered the taxiway the tower replied "uh, cleared to
cross." The captain released the brakes with velocity
about 30 knots. I then turned to check runway 25R and
saw air-carrier aircraft B just rotating about 300 feet
away. I shouted, 'No, no, no!' and raised my left hand.
The captain used maximum braking and we stopped just
short of encroaching on runway 25R. I believe we would
have had aircraft contact had we not stopped."
As with all controller-enabled incidents, traffic-spacing judgement and
vigilance are important factors in taxi transgressions. The next two exam-
ples describe problems arising from a controller's not being accurately aware
of an aircraft's actual position:
"We were clear to taxi to 13R hold short of 13L. After
holding short of 13L we were cleared to cross 13L hold
short of 17. After a few minutes we were told to taxi on
to 17 but hold short of 13R. After stopping the local
controller cleared a small transport to land right over
us. We do not feel he cleared us by very much, but can-
not say just how high aircraft B was when he went over
I,
US.
Reporter was working ground control, flight data, and
clearance delivery positions combined ....With approval of
local controller he cleared air-carrier A to taxi across
8L at taxiway 20. Local controller said small aircraft B
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was 4 mile final. Reporter was then distracted by other
duty as air carrier taxied slowly and small aircraft B
landed overtop of air carrier. Small aircraft B had bro-
ken out of overcast at about 300 ft. AGL and saw air car-
rier crossing so held altitude until passing overtop.
Reporter thinks local controller had misjudged distance
from airport on small aircraft B due possibly to poor
Brite scope display. Reporter had not given air carrier
the traffic on final as he thought it would not be fac-
tor. Says it took air carrier more than a minute to taxi
across runway.
Controller-enabled departure transgressions. - The final category of
controller-enabled errors includes those involving faulty or ill-advised
takeoff clearances. These types of incidents have already shown themselves
to stand out by the qualitatively high risk associated with them. The fac-
tors analysis indicates that they are also unique in terms of their causal
structures. Table 19 shows that, regardless of the enabling factor, the
predominant associated factors are amazingly consistent. Thus, controller-
enabled departure transgressions show much stronger factor correlations than
any of the other occurrence types. This is important because, whereas these
errors may indeed be the most dangerous, they may also be more understandable
and thus, easier to avoid.
As with taxi transgressions, the most common enabling factors are break-
downs in controller vigilance, traffic-spacing judgement, and intra-tower
coordination -- all forms of human error. The factors most frequently asso-
ciated with each of these are restricted visibility and intersecting runway
operations -- both considered predisposing conditions. These appear most
often even when coupled with enabling factors that appear relatively rarely.
Legitimately added to these is the intersection takeoff factor, which is seen
to be important in occurrences precipitated by a controller's failure to
sight aircraft, as well as the conglomeration of other less frequent enabling
factors.
The following ASRS reports exemplify the potential seriousness of a
controller's failure to visually locate an aircraft. By characterizing
reports with this enabling factor it is implied that the controller had some
means of ascertaining an aircraft's position more accurately. Each of the
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three examples also involves some form of restricted visibility, demonstrat-
ing the various causes of that condition:
"I gave ground control authorization to allow an airport
vehicle to drive onto runway 17 for a runway check.
Approximately 3 to 4 minutes later, I cleared small tran-
sport A to depart on runway 17 having forgotten about the
vehicle. The vehicle was not visible to me when I
scanned the runway prior to the departure clearance as
the runways were mostly covered with snow and visibility
sliL_htly restricted because of it. The vehicle was 4800
ft. down the runway when the jet passed over it. The
aircraft said nothing and it was not until the vehicle
reported the incident that we realized he was still on
the runway. Cause: Human error and the fact that
the vehicle was not visible to the tower because of run-
way conditions being partially snow covered."
The next occurrence took place on a clear VMC night:
"Departure runways 27 and 33L. Our aircraft too heavy
for runway 27. Runway 33L was landing runway. Our air-
craft was number 3 for departure at the hold behind two
small jet aircraft ....When the two small jets had
departed, our aircraft did not move forward as it was
very close to hold point. An aircraft departed off run-
way 27 and another heavy aircraft was seen on final for
runway 33L. Two to three minutes after departure on run-
way 27 our aircraft was cleared to line up and take off
and to expedite. High power was added immediately and
the aircraft moved forward - the check completed. The
tower then said hold short. The aircraft stopped with
its nose over the runway edge white line. Tower asked
where was our aircraft - was it short of the line? Cap-
tain responded that the nose was over the edge of runway
edge white line ....Tower said roger and cleared the heavy
jet on short final to land. The wing of the widebody
passed between 10 - 15 feet over top of our cockpit. Our
captain was sorry he did not tell tower that the landing
aircraft should go around."
In this report, multiple intersecting runways were in use, however, that is
not necessarily related to the cause of the problem. Not so in this next
incident, however:
"...medium-large air-carrier A was cleared for takeoff
1OR SFO. As we reached 100 - 105 knots tower said
quietly, "Takeoff clearance cancelled." We aborted take-
off. At this moment a small transport, B, on landing
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rollout 19R rolled across IOR. This is as close as I
have been, including combat. We did not hear the tower
give landing clearance to small transport B. Our clear-
ance for takeoff was clearly heard and understood by us
and we acknowledged. The large hangars north of runway
10 block the view of the landing area for runway 19. I
remember looking in that direction but did not see the
landing B. Neither of us saw aircraft B until we had
I,
almost stopped and he rolled past our nose. .
High-workload and high-traffic-volume situations can also precipitate
contro|ler error. The following report illustrates the possible confusion
that can develop when takeoffs are being conducted at different points along
a runway:
"I was working [airport] radar which had combined with it
[airport] coordination, [airport] tower, and cab coordi-
nator. Small transport A called [airport] tower for
departure. I told A to taxi into position and hold.
Shortly before this event, small transport B called [air-
port] tower for departure and I told B to hold short -
that small transport A would depart ahead of him. I did
observe an A type and a B type holding short of runway
13R at approach end. I didn't see a B type at 13R and
tax,way H when I scanned the runway. I scanned runway
13R, cleared A for takeoff, saw A start takeoff roll and
scanned runway 13R again. I still did not see a B type
at runway 13R at Hotel. I then told B to taxi into posi-
tion and hold. Shortly after this, small transport A
said he just missed B type on runway 13R. B also wanted
to know who had passed him. Due to the fact that I was
taking care of duties for the 3 other positions I was
working, I did not see how close small transport A and
small transport B came to one another. Small transport A
said he had to maneuver to the left to miss B. I feel a
contributing factor to this error was that B did not tell
me that he was at runway 13R at Hotel. Had I been told
,i
this, I would not have put B on the runway...
A controller's misjudging spacing between aircraft can also lead to a
hazardous circumstance when accompanied by intersecting runway operations:
"First aircraft cleared to land runway 31. Second air-
craft called ready for departure runway 36. Brite scope
position of first aircraft approximately 1 to 1-1/2 mile
on final when second aircraft was cleared for takeoff on
intersecting runway. Local controller's attention momen-
tarily diverted to person next to him, upon looking back,
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first aircraft was observed passing through intersection
approximately 200 ft. ahead of departing aircraft on run-
way 36."
In summary, the factors analysis has shown that runway transgressions
attributable to both pilot and controller errors arise from three general
problem areas:
Information transfer
• Awareness
Spatial judgement
Pilot-enabled transgressions indicate that difficulties with clearances, com-
munications, orientation, and preoccupations contribute to each occurrence
classification. Transgressions resulting from controller errors are, like-
wise, consistently due to failures in traffic spacing judgement, traffic
sighting, and intra-tower coordination. Factors such as restricted visibil-
ity and intersecting runway operations regularly appear as predisposing con-
ditions in both pilot and controller-enabled errors.
CONCLUSIONS
In general, the consequenceanalysis indicates that the danger inherent
to a specific type of transgression can be modeled by a cone of diminishing
time and space. The consequences of ASRS incidents are usually found to be
worse when aircraft and pilots are faced with decreasing reaction times. As
aircraft speed and/or acceleration increases, the risk associated with a
transgression error seems to increase. Occurrences during taxi are rela-
tively less risky because they occur at low speeds. Errors that involve
arrival aircraft pose a greater threat because touchdown speeds are so much
higher. However, even they seem to involve significantly less danger than
occurrences with departing aircraft whose speeds are not only high, but
steadily increasing.
The consequence analysis further points to the particular risk associ-
ated with controller-enabled departure transgressions. The frequency with
which these events result in critical conflicts is disproportionately high,
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and any attempt to mitigate runway transgression problems must logically
focus on this class of occurrences. Analysis of those reports received after
the controllers' strike further illustrates that the frequency and severity
of these incidents is increasing. In fact, there can be no doubt that this
transgression problem has not only worsened in the post-strike period, but
that post-strike events are the primary drivers for the enhanced risk that
controller-enabled departure transgressions exhibit over the entire timeline
of the study.
Coincidentally, although the controller-enabled departure transgression
is the highest risk classification, it is also the category that yielded the
strongest correlations of causal factors. This means that our understanding
of the predisposing conditions and types of errors is more complete for this
category than any of the others. The factors analysis shows that departure
errors occur more often when visibility is restricted and when multiple take-
off runways or multiple takeoff locations are used. Efforts at increasing
controller awareness of traffic location and, most importantly, emphasizing
the need to make visual contact with traffic during these conditions may have
a positive effect on the frequency of these occurrences.
Overall, the same enhanced awareness that will probably reduce
controller-enabled departure transgressions will also have desirable effects
in reducing the other types of controller-enabled incidents. Problems arise
when dealing with these other categories, however, because our knowledge of
the conditions that predispose them is less coherent.
The hazards associated with controller errors do not entirely overshadow
the effects of pilot-enabled incidents. This is especially true in the
post-strike period, where pilot transgressions during arrival are greatly
magnified. Any steps that enable pilots to minimize the probability of a
misunderstood clearance and decrease cockpit preoccupations are likely to
result in a reduction of transgression occurrences.
The only direct and unequivocal measure of risk in aviation is
acciden t
or kill.
the
record itself. Close calls, no matter how frequent, do not injure
They can be scary, however, and the question that must be addressed
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is whether such incidents justifiably deserve attention. Can the near-
accident be presumedto arise from the same types of circumstances and
behavior incipient to real accidents? It is not clear that a fully satisfac-
tory answer to this question can be obtained in the near-term. The best we
can do now is proceed on the assumption that incident causation is to some
measure, related to the causes of accidents, and attempt to use this rela-
tionship to motivate constructive change.
Attempts at improving safety must rightfully prioritize themselves on a
cost-benefit basis. A fundamental part of this process is to identify opera-
tional areas where the greatest improvementsmay be achieved, and whether
methods of instigating change will unacceptably constrain user benefits.
This study has madeno attempt to quantify runway transgressions in terms of
their contribution to the overall risk of flying. What it has done is to
compare the various occurrence classifications and their associated risks
relative to each other.
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APPENDIX A: Sample Dataset Analysis Coding and Key
TYPE OF OCCURRENCE
1. Animal on runway
2. Failure to vacate runway
3. Improper landing clearance
4. Improper "position and hold" clearance
5. Improper runway crossing clearance
6. Improper takeoff clearance
7. Improper taxi clearance
8. Taxiway landing
9. Unauthorized landing
10. Unauthorized runway crossing
11. Unauthorized runway entry
12. Unauthorized takeoff
13. Unauthorized taxi
14. Wrong airport landing
15. Wrong runway landing
ENABLING ACTOR
1. Pilot
2. Controller
3. Pilot & controller
4. Ground vehicle operator
5. Animal
6. Pedestrian
7. Unknown
FACTOR LIST (* indicates a predisposing condition)
1. AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT PROBLEM *
2. AIRCRAFT OPERATING PROCEDURE
_]K__INT£NTIONALLY BLANK
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED A-3
3. AIRPORT CONFIGURATION *
4. AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION *
5. AIRPORT LIGHTING *
6. AIRPORT SURFACE CONDITION *
7. AMBIGUOUS CLEARANCE
8. ANTICIPATORY CLEARANCE
9. ATCT COORDINATION PROBLEM
I0. ATCT EQUIPMENT PROBLEM *
ii, ATCT/APPROACH COORDINATION PROBLEM
12. ATIS PROBLEM *
13. CHART PROBLEM *
14, CLOSED RUNWAY *
15. COCKPIT COFIvIUNICATIONS PROBLEM
16. COCKPIT COORDINATION PROBLEM
17. COMPLEX CLEARANCE
18. CONTROLLER FATIGUE *
19. CONTROLLER DISTRACTION/TRAFFIC *
20. CONTROLLER DISTRACTION/UNSPECIFIED *
21. CONTROLLER FAILURE TO FOLLOW STANDARD PROCEDURES
22. CONTROLLER FAILURE TO ISSUE "HOLD SHORT" RESTRICTION
23. CONTROLLER FAILURE TO ISSUE CLEARANCE BUT THOUGHT HE HAD
24. CONTROLLER FAILURE TO ISSUE FREQUENCY CHANGE
25. CONTROLLER FAILURE TO VlSUALLY LOCATE TRAFFIC POSITION
26. CONTROLLER INEXPERIENCE *
27. CONTROLLER LACK OF VIGILANCE
28. CONTROLLER MISJUDGEMENT OF TRAFFIC SPACING
29. CONTROLLER MISSTATEMENT OF INTENDED CLEARANCE
30. CONTROLLER RADIO OPERATION PROBLEM
31. CONTROLLER WORKLOAD*
32. CONTROLLER/PILOT RELATIONSHIP *
33. CLEARANCE REVISED
34. DIVERSION TO AN ALTERNATE AIRPORT *
35. EMERGENCY IN PROGRESS*
36. EXPECTED CLEARANCE
37. EXPEDITE CLEARANCE *
A-4
38. FACILITYMANAGEMENTPOLICY*
39. FREQUENCYONGESTION*
40. FUELCONSERVATIONPRESSURE*
41. GROUNDVEHICLEOPERATORHEARINGPROTECTION*
42. HEARBACKPROBLEM
43. IMPRACTICALCLEARANCER STRICTION
44. INTERSECTIONTAKEOFFS*
45. LANGUAGEPROBLEM*
46, MULTIPLERUNWAYOPERATION-- INTERSECTINGRUNWAYS*
47. MULTIPLERUNWAYOPERATION-- OPPOSITEDIRECTIONRUNWAYS*
48. MULTIPLERUNWAYOPERATION-- PARALLELRUNWAYS
49, Not Used
50. NIGHTOPERATIONS*
51. NORADIOABOARD*
52. Not Used
53. NON-STANDARDTRAFFICPATTERN*
54. PILOTACTINGONA CLEARANCEFORANOTHERAIRCRAFT
55. PILOTDISORIENTATION*
56. PILOTDISTRACTION/EQUIPMENTFAILURE*
57. PILOTDISTRACTION/FLYING*
58. PILOTDISTRACTION/RADIO*
59. PILOTDISTRACTION/TRAFFIC*
60. PILOTDISTRACTION/UNSPECIFIED*
61. PILOTDISTRACTION/WEATHER*
62. PILOTFAILURETOASCERTAINATIS INFORMATION
63. PILOTFAILURETOCONTACTATCTDURINGAPPROACH
64. PILOTFAILURETOFOLLOWCLEARANCE
65. PILOTFAILURETOFOLLOWSTANDARDPROCEDURES
66. PILOTFAILURETOGOAROUND
67. Not Used
68. PILOTFAILURETO QUESTIONIMPROPERCLEARANCE
69. PILOTFAILURETO RECEIVE"HOLDSHORT"RESTRICTION
70. PILOTFAILURETO REQUESTCLEARANCE
71. PILOTFAILURETOREQUESTLANDINGTRAFFICGO-AROUND
72, PILOTFAILURETOVACATERUNWAY
A-5
73.
74.
75.
76,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
PILOT FAILURE TO VERIFY NON-STANDARD PROCEDURE
PILOT FATIGUE *
PILOT HABIT *
PILOT INADEQUATE PREFLIGHT PLANNING
PILOT INEXPERIENCE *
PILOT LACK OF INFLIGHT PLANNING
PILOT LACK OF VIGILANCE
PILOT MISOPERATION OF RADIO
PILOT MISUNDERSTANDING OF CLEARANCE
PILOT MISUNDERSTANDING OF STANDARD PROCEDURES
PILOT NON-STANDARD RADIO PROCEDURES
PILOT UNFAMILIARITY WITH AIRCRAFT *
PILOT UNFAMILIARITY WITH AIRPORT *
PILOT WORKLOAD *
RADIO COMMUNICATION PROBLEM *
RADIO EQUIPMENT PROBLEM*
READBACK PROBLEM
RESTRICTED VISIBILITY *
RUNWAY/TAXIWAY MARKINGS/SIGNS PROBLEM *
SCHEDULE PRESSURE *
SIMILAR ALPHANUMERICS *
SIMULTANEOUS RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
WAKE TURBULENCE AVOIDANCE *
SPECIAL EVENT IN PROGRESS *
SPECIAL VFR SITUATION *
SUPERVISOR/CONTROLLER RELATIONSHIP *
TRAFFIC VOLUME *
TRAINING IN PROGRESS *
UNIQUE AIRPORT PROCEDURES *
UNIQUE AIRPORT RADIO PROCEDURES *
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN TRAFFIC *
UNTIMELY CLEARANCE
USE OF NON-STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY
WEATHER PROBLEM *
A-6
CONSEQUENCE (CONS)
C - Critical
H - Hazardous
P - Potential
N - None
RECOVERY ACTIONS (RACT)
I. Pilot request for revised clearance
2. Pilot evasive action
3. Controller directed go-around
4. Controller directed takeoff abort
5. No action
6. Pilot made repeated attempts to request clearance
7. Controller issuance of a revised clearance
8. Pilot aborted takeoff
9. Controller directed takeoff abort
10. Pilot initiated go-around
11. Traffic warning issued
12. Pilot vigilance
13. Pilot request for revised clearance
14. Ground vehicle evasive action
15. Controller directed evasive action
A-7
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SAMPLE DATASET FACTOR ASSIGNMENTS
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APPENDIX C
AGGREGATED FACTOR COMPOSITION
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APPENDIX C: Aggregated Factor Composition
AGGREGATED FACTOR CONSTITUTING FACTORS
AIRCRAFT 1. Aircraft equipment problem
56. Pilot distraction/equipment failure
AIRPORT GEOGRAPHY 3. Airport configuration
46. Multiple runway operation
48. Multiple runway operation
-- intersecting runways
-- parallel runways
AIRPORT PROCEDURES 101. Unique airport procedures
102. Unique airport radio procedures
AIRPORT SURFACE 4. Airport construction
6. Airport surface condition
14. Closed runway
91. Runway/taxiway markings/signs
ATC COORDINATION
PROBLEM
9. ATCT coordination problem
11. ATCT/Approach coordination problem
COMMUNICATION PROBLEM 12. ATIS problem
15. Cockpit communications problem
30. Controller radio operation problem
39. Frequency congestion
45. Language problem
51. No radio aboard
62. Pilot failure to ascertain ATIS information
80. Pilot misoperation of radio
83. Pilot non-standard radio procedures
87. Radio communication problem
88. Radio equipment problem
93. Similar alphanumerics
94. Simultaneous radio transmissions
102. Unique airport radio procedures
106. Use of non-standard phraseology
CONTROLLER CLEARANCE
PROBLEM
7. Ambiguous clearance
8. Anticipatory clearance
17. Complex clearance
23. Controller failure to issue clearance but
thought he had
29. Controller misstatement of intended clearance
33. Clearance revised
37. Expedite clearance
42. Hearback problem
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
C-3 _.IkI_E._INT_NI|ONALLY BLAN_
43. Impractical clearance restriction
105. Untimely clearance
CONTROLLERDISTRACTION 19. Controller distraction/traffic
20. Controller distraction/unspecified
CONTROLLERT AFFIC
SIGHTINGAND
VIGILANCE
25. Controller failure to visually
posi ti on
27. Controller lack of vigilance
104. Unknowntraffic
1oc ate traffic
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 32. Controller/pilot relationship
38. Facility management pol icy
98. Supervisor/controller relationship
PILOT CLEARANCE PROBLEM 36. Expected clearance
54. Pilot acting on a clearance for another aircraft
64. Pilot failure to follow clearance
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